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G uest editors M. Angela Sasse and Matthew Smith discuss the origins of the security–
usability trade off myth with leading academic experts 
Heather Lipford and Kami Vaniea and industry expert 
Cormac Herley.
Sasse: Have there been instances in which people have 
said, “we can’t make this usable,” or “making it usable 
would make it less secure, so we’re not even going to try”? 
Herley: This is the go-to language I hear when people 
want to phone in an excuse: “We can’t do better in 
usability because security is so important. Password 
length and composition policies might be unwieldy, but 
they’re necessary to make things secure.” 
Lipford: Researchers have discovered that changing 
passwords every three months is ineffective at increasing 
security and only encourages people to reuse passwords 
in predictable ways. What’s more important than chang-
ing passwords is getting people to use unique passwords 
for important sites. This finding has resulted in changes to 
guidelines (www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system 
/uploads/attachment_data/file/458857/Password 
_guidance_-_simplifying_your_approach.pdf). 
Herley: Another example of the security–usability trade-
off myth is the masking of passwords in the browser. 
Until recently, this was pretty much ubiquitous in every 
version of every browser—but why? Where’s the evi-
dence that it’s actually accomplishing any good? 
Sasse: Password masking is a classic example of the 
security– usability myth because, from a user’s view-
point, if you can’t see that you’ve made a mistake—if 
you’re missing that feedback—you don’t know what’s 
wrong when you can’t log in. Under certain circum-
stances, unmasked passwords could give some informa-
tion to an attacker. This risk isn’t high, whereas statistics 
show that legitimate users mistype their passwords at 
least one in 10 times.
Herley: Right, this has become much more pronounced 
with the ubiquity of soft keyboards and mobile devices. 
Mobile devices were the first to give the option of dis-
playing your password when the unnecessary misery it 
was causing became obvious. 
Generally, the way I think of tradeoff in an engineer-
ing sense is, I’m trading off X for Y, which means I give 
up a little of X, and I get a little more of Y. But implicit 
in the idea of tradeoff is that I’m not really talking about 
zero X or infinite X, or a zero Y or infinite Y. 
If we’re talking about a tradeoff between security 
and usability, it implies there’s some operating point 
where getting a little more security for less usability 
wouldn’t necessarily be a good deal. But when people 
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claim there’s a tradeoff, they never follow it up with, 
say, “Here is how much security you’re going to get, 
here is a precise statement of how much password 
masking helps in terms of security, and here’s how 
much it hurts in terms of usability. We’re making an 
informed decision and getting a good deal for what 
we’re giving up.” 
It masquerades as a tradeoff, but it’s really just a stalk-
ing horse for the claim that we always need more security.
Lipford: However, time and again, researchers have 
shown that decreasing the usability can lead to less 
security because you’re asking people to do things that 
they, in reality, aren’t able to 
do. Again, this leads 
to a false tradeoff. 
We need to figure out 
what behaviors peo-
ple can do, are willing 
to do, have the time 
and effort to do to 
get the most security 
possible. So we can talk about a balance, but to me that 
doesn’t imply, like Herley said, that security will neces-
sarily decrease. In many cases, you’re actually improv-
ing security by increasing usability.
Herley: If you’re serious about building a good system, 
you wouldn’t insist that there’s a tradeoff between two 
things and then not bother to measure either of those 
things. For instance, for the battery in your phone, 
there’s a tradeoff between weight and how long it will 
charge. That doesn’t lead us to the conclusion that the 
battery’s weight should be zero, or be 10 pounds so that 
it never runs out. You measure how much you’re getting 
and decide on some operating point. 
The usable security community is shining the light 
on the fact that we’re actually not getting much in 
exchange for the usability burden imposed. The issues 
we’ve been discussing—password masking and com-
position policies—come with a fairly clear demand in 
terms of what they ask of technology users. I’m asking 
you to change your password every 70 days. The prom-
ise of what you’re getting in return for it is very vague.
Smith: One issue here might be something we can’t 
measure that well—how attackers will react to a secu-
rity feature disappearing. We’re currently saying, “well, 
the risk of someone shoulder-surfing a password in real 
life is actually fairly slim, so password masking doesn’t 
make sense in a usable security tradeoff situation.” How-
ever, if we drop the feature, we open a new attack vector. 
Any kind of measurement we did beforehand isn’t valid 
once we’ve made the change.
Sasse: Even when, from a usability viewpoint, you pro-
vide evidence of an actual burden, there’s no evidence 
being provided to quantify the security risks. So we 
can’t actually make an informed tradeoff.
Herley: It’s a case of trading off X versus Y but I need infi-
nite X (security), which isn’t what we generally describe 
as a tradeoff. When one of the variables is zero or infin-
ity, calculations get strange quickly. 
One can’t just say, “let’s measure how much of every 
particular attack we see and this countermeasure. No 
one is hitting this countermeasure right now; therefore, 
if we take it out, it won’t do any harm.” But data doesn’t 
answer all questions. Draw-
ing an attack tree or 
writing down the pre-
cise circumstances 
that apply for the 
assumptions under 
which a countermea-
sure is making a dif-
ference—sooner or 
later there’s no escape from making plausibility assess-
ments. We can’t invest in absolutely every countermea-
sure for every attack that anyone can think of. We must 
make tradeoffs and say we’re going to invest in this and 
this, and not in that.
Lipford: There’s an important set of users that I want to 
make sure aren’t overlooked in this discussion, which 
are the security experts—security administrators, sys-
tems administrators, software developers, and so on. 
They use numerous tools for security to configure 
infrastructures and look for security bugs in their code. 
Usability plays a large role here, too. If these tools are 
unusable, experts will misconfigure, leaving vulnerabili-
ties in applications. And yet usability is still overlooked 
in those tools. There doesn’t appear to be a usability–
security tradeoff argument here. Usability isn’t a large 
focus yet, but it could have a big impact because the 
security of our servers, infrastructure, and applications 
impacts end user security. 
Smith: That’s a very excellent point. Have you come 
across any myths in this area?
Lipford: The main myths are that experts are mostly 
happy with their tools and they don’t care much about 
usability. Many of the tools are command line and aren’t 
heavily GUI based, but those that are come with a lot 
of power. 
At the same time, there’s a culture, and some experts, 
having undergone the large learning curve for these 
tools, now have this set of tools at their command that 
Time and again, researchers have 
shown that decreasing the usability 
can lead to less security.
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others don’t. It means that they’re experts in their fields 
and are valuable. But overall, this perception hurts the 
community. There’s a high bar of entry to becoming, 
for example, a security administrator and learning some 
of the ins and outs of the tools. It takes a lot of learn-
ing and training and money and time to get those up 
to speed. Yes, experts are willing to learn unusable tools 
and get around the lack of usability—and in the end, 
they understand and can use those tools well. But this 
learning curve hurts the overall security of an organiza-
tion or a country. 
Smith: One of the things you said is my favorite myth 
in this area: experts don’t make mistakes. Basically 
every single vulnerability, every single misintegration is 
a developer or administrator making a mistake. That’s 
something we need to rethink. Every mistake an expert 
makes affects so many more people than just themselves.
Sasse: One impact of warnings, whether for SSL cer-
tificates or other things, is that they’ve basically trained 
users to ignore all warnings. Erring on the side of secu-
rity might seem the safe choice, but if a feature isn’t 
working for users, it will ultimately undermine security.
Smith: Right. There’s no doubt about the click-through 
phenomenon because people to just want to make 
warnings go away as fast as possible. Application writ-
ers throw popups and warnings, and ask users far too 
often for security decisions that users are not necessarily 
able to make. Even though there’s scary stuff out there, 
the relentless procession of false positives has effectively 
taught people that clicking through warnings is almost 
always the right answer. Therefore, the warnings that 
we’re trying to give people, when they’re not false posi-
tives, get thrown out with the bathwater. That’s a defi-
nite example where more security has produced very 
much the opposite of the intended effect.
Lipford: Warning research has come a long way. Some 
very good research has come out of Google in par-
ticular. The warning’s design, how you communicate 
the information, and the options you provide are very 
important; these can make a big difference in how much 
people pay attention and adhere to the warnings. 
And then there’s a habituation problem—basically 
bothering users with warnings perceived as false posi-
tives, whether they are or not. Reducing the number of 
warnings that people saw actually increased the likeli-
hood that they adhered to those warnings. 
Herley: Which ties back to your earlier point: one of 
the reasons for so many false positives—misconfigured 
certificates—has been reduced in the last two or three 
years. The experience of trying to deploy and administer 
an SSL site was itself very unusable.
Sasse: The myth in the security community was that 
SSL certificates were a good thing, when in reality they 
weren’t, because few developers were able to implement 
them correctly.
Herley: Yeah, I wrote in a paper—must be like six or 
seven years ago now [add reference?]—that 100 per-
cent of SSL certificate errors were false positives and 
that not a single user had been saved from harm by a 
certificate error warning. I dared people to give me 
counterexamples. And in the seven years since, I think 
I’ve had one person approach me with what seemed like 
a credible case in which a certificate error had actually 
been spotted—not by an end user but an administra-
tor. The fact that such an extreme statement didn’t pro-
duce a deluge of security experts coming to me saying, 
“no, you’re wrong, and here’s the documented instances 
where it’s not 100 percent the case,” is somewhat telling.
Vaniea: I’ve been doing some work with updates, and 
Windows 10 is a perfect example of this. Many admin-
istrators, and I imagine, the people behind Windows 
10, believe that giving users options is a good way to 
destroy your security. So they just blow aside all the user 
concerns and automatically set up security. Then when 
users start figuring out ways to get around it—because 
going around it is the only way to get anything sane 
happening— the organizations take away that option. 
I cite Windows 10 here because it’s prevented home 
users—and home users only—from disabling auto-
matic updating on the system. 
While I was interviewing users about updates, one 
told me that he looked through all the updates and 
unchecked the suspicious-looking ones. I explained this 
to an administrator that evening as an example of how 
people are handling the updates, and he just turned to me 
and said, “the audacity of a user to question the opinion 
of the expert who put this update in there is shocking.” 
Consequently, I began collecting piles of anecdotal 
evidence from users who talked to me about how 
they’re in a permanent update cycle—their systems 
start updating then crash, they spend two hours remov-
ing the update, and do it all again tomorrow. They lit-
erally have to pull the plug on the computers and the 
Internet to use it for anything. Users are making bad 
decisions. We can take away their ability to make deci-
sions, but now we’re starting see to the side effects of 
lack of usability.
Lipford: Updating is a good example of where, for the 
most part, systems are more secure because it’s become 
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automated. However, Vaniea and others have also dem-
onstrated that users aren’t getting very good information 
about what’s in the updates. We’ve all had experiences 
where an update will change the user interface of an 
application or will suddenly not work because of a cer-
tain system configuration. Users don’t understand that 
critical security updates are also an aspect of updates, 
so if this important piece of information isn’t communi-
cated, users might decide to 
delay updates, think-
ing that that’s not a 
problem. What they 
want to do is delay 
the nonsecurity prob-
lems associated with 
updates, but in the 
end, this has secu-
rity implications—
they’re missing potentially important security updates. 
So giving users an option here is important because 
updates can negatively affect them. But we need to give 
them additional information to help them make better 
and more informed decisions. 
Vaniea: Some beautiful work on this has come out of 
Google. Rob Reeder examined the best way to stay 
secure online, and he has a graphic that shows that 
security experts rate updating at the top of their list. 
Updating didn’t even make the list of things that users 
considered to be important. The security experts are 
reacting, saying “updating is the most important thing; 
why aren’t users doing it; let’s take away the decision 
making.” But we’re not communicating to users that 
updating things like Adobe Reader has anything to do 
with security, so they don’t perceive it as a security prob-
lem. Instead of fixing the communication, we’re just see-
ing enforcement.
Sasse: There’s also the problem of “improving” security 
that doesn’t need improving. We’ve seen an increase 
in two-factor authentication [2FA]. Some well-estab-
lished 2FA products have a one-time password [OTP] 
that’s valid for one minute, and it’s just six numbers. 
Some companies produce more sophisticated 2FA 
products that can generate longer alphanumeric OTPs. 
So some security experts decided to change to an eight-
digit alphanumeric OTP “because it is more secure than 
a six-digit code.” The consequences for users trying to 
enter these are disastrous: you can’t read off an eight-
character complex OTP, rehearse it in short-term mem-
ory, and enter it into the system that you need to enter 
it into in one step. So you need to start looking back and 
forth between the token and the screen, and that causes 
users to make mistakes and then run out of time. But 
a six-digit code is strong enough for an OTP that only 
lasts a minute.
Herley: That’s a good example of reasoning backward 
from “more security.” More security is better, and there-
fore, we’re going to do this. It’s unusable, but that’s 
where the tradeoff is, so “too bad, your usability is going 
to be worse.” The set of circumstances where the secu-
rity benefit between six and 
eight digits is so small 
as to not be worth any 
usability hit what-
soever. If I can see 
a scenario in which 
this might increase 
security, I now have 
carte blanche to do 
whatever—no matter 
what happens to usability. That’s collateral damage.
Lipford: So how do we combat this myth? One way is 
to advocate for understanding the impact on usability, 
the security impact as well. And Herley, you did this 
nicely when you pointed out the difference between an 
online password that can sustain an online attack versus 
a password that can withstand an offline—say a brute-
force attack [add reference?]. The required strength for 
those two is very different, so if a password composition 
policy requires you to fall somewhere in the middle, 
you’re not gaining any additional security—and you’re 
adding more burden to users. 
Organizations need to decide what their goals are. 
If you need to withstand an offline attack and to have 
that strong a password, then you’re asking users to be 
burdened to do something more for no real security 
gains—or the nebulous security gains that you have 
difficulty explaining. This is where policymakers, devel-
opers, designers, and so on, make mistakes because 
they’re not gaining real security, and yet they’re making 
things less usable. One way to combat this is to help 
people understand what the real threats are and how to 
prioritize them. 
Herley: I think you’ve hit it on the nail: the problem with 
talking about the tradeoff between usability and secu-
rity is that it encourages very imprecise thinking. If you 
try to tabulate or write down the set of assumptions or 
the attack scenario under which this will make a differ-
ence, it ends up being either nonexistent, or so narrow 
that it’s not worth it. 
But it’s as you said: all too often, that step never hap-
pens. Security experts simply invoke the myth of trade-
off between usability and security and use this as cover 
to avoid the exercise of saying precisely what security 
Users are making bad decisions. We 
can take away their ability to make 
decisions, but now we’re starting to see 
the side effects of lack of usability.
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benefit in precisely what scenarios this usability burden 
is going to deliver. 
Vaniea: It’s also an economics problem of who makes 
decision and who has the controls. One interesting 
usability question from an administrator perspective 
came up during the recent Cyber UK, which includes 
practitioners and academics, and a range of different 
groups. Someone said “we made this mistake before; we 
used to include a dial on administrators’ user interfaces 
so they could choose the security level that they felt 
most appropriate for their organization.” And it caused 
every security person to dial it to the highest number 
they could possibly put it on, because their job isn’t to 
make the company efficient; their job is to make certain 
they’re not getting blamed for security compromises. 
Sasse: So how could we start tackling this? How do we 
start to improve understanding of what good security 
looks like?
Vaniea: A lot of it revolves around measurement. I can 
measure dialing up to 11, or I can tell you I used a really 
horrible password policy. It’s harder to enumerate how 
much time it’s wasting the company, it’s harder to enu-
merate the opportunity costs that are lost due to secu-
rity, and it’s really hard to measure the number of people 
sidestepping and therefore decreasing security because 
they’re actively trying to make sure you don’t notice.
Sasse: We found it fairly straightforward to measure the 
negative impact of unusable security on productivity— 
it’s just that nobody had ever done it. When we inform 
businesspeople the amount of time employees are 
spending on security, and the kinds of workarounds 
they’re creating just to be able to deliver a business, 
they are completely aghast—the cost was hidden. In my 
experience, the security experts just don’t consider the 
impact, or how to measure.
Vaniea: You’re explaining to the security experts how 
to do these types of measurements. You said it well in 
one of your prior presentations: It’s easy to measure 
how long the password requirements are. I’m trained in 
how to do that as a computer scientist. I’m not trained 
in how to do these other, less obvious measurements, 
and if you want to talk about things like usability for 
system administrators, how do we make some of the 
measurements you’re talking about easier to do or more 
accessible, or more obvious. I’m on a “system adminis-
trator usability” kick, but I’m focused on usability for 
all the humans in this process. And at the moment, it’s 
not obvious to system administrators how to do some 
of these things.
Herley: Usable security and measuring what we can 
measure have helped to demonstrate the burden of 
what we ask users to do. It’s a two-pronged approach: 
One is demonstrating the burden. Often, when you 
point out the burden, security people are very good at 
saying, well, too bad; it’s security, you need to do it. 
The second prong of attack is to point out that much 
of the security benefit has been assumed or asserted 
rather than shown. For instance, many people assert 
that forcing people to change their passwords every 70 
days is an absolutely necessary policy, but do we have 
the data to support it? No. Can we prove it from first 
principles? No. Measuring the usability burden of this 
and, at the same time, pointing out the set of circum-
stances under which this actually improves outcomes 
when you write down all the assumptions or what an 
attacker has to do—it becomes very narrow. 
It’s a combination of measuring the usability burden 
and forcing people to be more precise on exactly under 
what circumstances going from a six-digit, one-time 
code to an eight-character alphanumeric will make an 
improvement.
Vaniea: He’s dead on.
Lipford: We need to convince the experts, because 
they’re the ones making the decisions on application 
design and organization policy. Very few of them get 
training in usable security, so they aren’t aware of the 
methods or any of the lessons that we’ve learned. 
There are various ways to get the results of our 
research to these folks. Our community is still fairly 
young, and it’s going to take time for us to have the bulk 
of research to be able to translate it into practice. But 
we can make a more concerted effort to do that as well 
as put in a larger effort to spread usable security edu-
cation. Not just through folks like us who are in the 
community, but integrating the important usability 
lessons—the ones that really demonstrate the value of 
understanding people and their behavior—into more 
standard security education. That’s one problem I’m 
very interested in pursuing.
Vaniea: Recently GCHQ [Government Communica-
tions Headquarters; the agency that sets information 
security standards in the UK] released official guidance 
on passwords-based on research. I’m currently analyz-
ing an email list run by patch administrators who dis-
covered this document. It resulted in about 60 emails of 
debate on where this document had come from and who 
this group was that had released it—because most of 
the experts on the mailing list are Americans—whether 
this group could be trusted, whether or not this group 
knew what they were talking about, and if the document 
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made any sense. They weren’t able to get the answers to 
their key questions out of that document. Many of them 
seem to have rejected it because it didn’t align with their 
beliefs, and there was nothing there that caused them to 
change their opinion, because it hadn’t actually targeted 
their opinion problem. Rather, it focused on what they 
needed to do. 
Herley: At the same time, I’m very encouraged that 
GCHQ did the somewhat brave thing of recognizing 
limitations in its recent document “Password Guidance: 
Simplifying Your Approach” [www.cesg.gov.uk/guid-
ance/password-guidance-simplifying-your-approach]. 
We all want more security, but we’ve been dialing it up 
to 11. 
I’m definitely encouraged that organizations like 
GCHQ are now willing to revisit things that have been 
taken as accepted wis-
dom for so long, and 
yet don’t have a lot 
grounding to them. 
The National Insti-
tute of Standards 
and Technology 
(NIST) is currently 
relooking at its 
800-63 document [http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs 
/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf], which 
is a similar set of guidance for the US. Microsoft put 
out something recently in its consumer-facing mes-
saging about how it dialed back on a few of the pass-
word things that were largely unsupported by evidence 
and were causing unnecessary misery among users 
[www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content 
/uploads/2016/06/Microsoft_Password_Guidance 
-1.pdf]. In other words, it’s progressing slowly in a num-
ber of organizations, and not just ones with exclusive 
responsibility around usability. Ones that are looked to 
for guidance in security are starting to get more realistic.
Lipford: This field has many open questions, so there’s a 
lot of room for researchers to gather some of that data 
and demonstrate the impact of different design, usabil-
ity, and policy choices to policymakers or organizations. 
We still have a big need for more research in this area, 
and that in itself will be very valuable to eventually com-
batting this myth and to making technologies and sys-
tems that are both usable and secure.
Sasse: Until last year, many papers focused on how to 
make users pay more attention to warnings that are 
utterly useless. That is such a fundamental misunder-
standing of what usability is about. One article in this spe-
cial issue actually points out that both security specialists 
and developers have fundamental misconceptions about 
usability [D. Caputo et al., “Barriers to Usable Security? 
Three Organizational Case Studies,” pp. XX]. They see it 
as only about “making something look pretty.” 
Herley: I find this a problem in the technology field in 
general, not only in security. User experience, as a field, 
is still growing and maturing, and putting that message 
out. So I don’t think we’re doing it alone. In our field, 
we’re obviously targeting security experts, but we need 
to look at how others are targeting usability toward 
everyone in computing, because I find that opinion 
prevalent, not just among security specialists but peo-
ple who have no or very little training in usability and 
human–computer interaction. 
The other thing that security experts often have fun-
damental misunderstandings about is security itself. 
We simply don’t have the 
data that shows that 
many of the things we 
assert make a differ-
ence are as important 
as we say. Couple this 
with a poor under-
standing of usability 
and the usability bur-
dens, and it’s a toxic brew. And as Sasse says, there’s been 
a lot of emphasis on getting users to pay more attention 
to warnings under the unquestioned assumption that 
(a) they should be spending more time on these warn-
ings and (b) they should always default to the most con-
servative option, which is to disconnect when there’s a 
certificate error. And often, those assumptions are just 
simply incorrect. When 99.999 percent of certificate 
errors are false positives and users have a task to com-
plete, spending more time examining the certificate or 
terminating the task—that’s not the correct answer. The 
correct answer is to spend as little time on it as possible. 
Failing to recognize our own fallibility is certainly hold-
ing us back.
Vaniea: There’s also the broad problem of trying to iden-
tify what is it you should be doing. It’s a question I get 
asked all the time. “What do I do to be secure?” We don’t 
say this, but we don’t actually know the answer. It’s hard 
to then step back and look at all of security and ask, what 
is it that must happen in this scenario, or what is the best 
outcome for this user? We don’t see enough researchers 
stepping back to ask what a person actually needs to do 
and how we can make that the most usable thing.
Herley: I think saying “I actually don’t know the top three 
things that will guarantee to keep you safe online” is bet-
ter than doing a denial-of-service attack on the user’s 
Often, when you point out the 
usability burden, security people are 
very good at saying, well, too bad; 
it’s security, you need to do it.
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cognitive burden—giving an endless list that stretches 
to the horizon, happy in the knowledge that no user is 
every going to do it. But at least I can’t be blamed when 
things go wrong. 
For example, if you’re trying to trade off two differ-
ent things, is it more important that I change my pass-
word every 90 days or that I never write it down? The 
honest answer is we don’t have the tools to even answer 
questions like that. Admitting that ignorance, if only 
at first to ourselves, is a first step in trying to figure out 
what it would take to answer that question. 
Sasse: Finally, who could do something in this space, 
and what would it take to correct the misconceptions 
that currently drive this? 
Lipford: First and foremost, we need to translate the 
research we’ve already seen into actual guidelines and 
policies for best practices and having conversations 
with those who can disseminate this info—for instance, 
NIST in the US and similar institutions in other coun-
tries. People trust these organizations and assume the 
issues have gone through some level of discussion and 
debate. Because let’s face it: a very busy security admin-
istrator or software designer isn’t going to read any indi-
vidual paper on behavior outcomes, but they will read 
and follow guidelines in their field for decisions. 
Vaniea: It’s important to educate or at least put these ideas 
in the language of people who make these decisions, from 
system administrators to software developers. We also 
need to find ways to codesign education materials within 
those spaces, with those groups, so that the information 
is being cast in light of their own interests. 
Herley: When people talk about the tradeoff between 
usability and security, the thing that I find most surpris-
ing is that they seem to treat it with the same reverence 
as one of Newton’s laws or Maxwell’s equations when it 
really just has the status of a slogan. The keys to getting 
rid of the myth and getting a sensible tradeoff in the use 
of user time are forcing precision, doing more measure-
ments in usability, and making clear the magnitude of 
the burden as well as forcing clarity on precisely when 
and under what circumstances this burden will make a 
difference. Because if we allow a simple slogan to deter-
mine our design choices, it’s won’t be surprising when 
we end up without an optimal allocation of resources, 
such as user time.
Sasse: Great, thank you very much all of you for your 
time and for your contributions to this. 
M. Angela Sasse is a computer science professor at Univer-
sity College London. Contact her at a.sasse@ucl.ac.uk.
Cormac Herley is a principal researcher at Microsoft. 
Contact him at cormac@microsoft.com.
Heather Lipford is an associate professor at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Charlotte. Contact her at 
heather.lipford@uncc.edu.
Matthew Smith is a computer science professor at Uni-
versity of Bonn. Contact him at smith@cs.uni-bonn.de.
Kami Vaniea is a lecturer in cybersecurity at the Univer-
sity of Edinburgh. Contact her at kvaniea@inf.ed.ac.uk. 
Selected CS articles and columns are also available for free 
at http://ComputingNow.computer.org.
